Mechanisms for the Marriage and the Assignment Game

Starting with two models fifty years ago, the discrete marriage game [1] and the continuous assignment game [2], the study of stable matchings has evolved into a rich theory with applications in many areas. Most notably, it has lead to a number of truthful mechanisms that have seen a recent rejuvenation in the context of sponsored search. In this paper we survey the history of these problems and provide several links to ongoing research in the field.


Published in:
Algorithms And Complexity, Proceedings, 6078, 6-12
Presented at:
7th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity, Rome, ITALY, May 26-28, 2010
Year:
2010
Publisher:
Springer-Verlag New York, Ms Ingrid Cunningham, 175 Fifth Ave, New York, Ny 10010 Usa
ISBN:
978-3-642-13072-4
Keywords:
Laboratories:




 Record created 2011-12-16, last modified 2018-09-13


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