000171931 001__ 171931
000171931 005__ 20190316235242.0
000171931 020__ $$a978-1-4244-6307-7
000171931 02470 $$2ISI$$a000294962100022
000171931 037__ $$aCONF
000171931 245__ $$aAn Improved Technique to Discover Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations
000171931 269__ $$a2010
000171931 260__ $$bIeee Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, Po Box 1331, Piscataway, Nj 08855-1331 Usa$$c2010
000171931 336__ $$aConference Papers
000171931 520__ $$aThe techniques generally used to detect compromising emanations are based on a wide-band receiver tuned on a specific frequency or a spectral analyzer with a limited bandwidth. However, these methods may not be optimal since a significant amount of information is lost during the signal acquisition. In this paper, we propose a straightforward but efficient approach which acquires raw signal directly from the antenna and processes the entire captured electromagnetic spectrum thanks to the computation of short time Fourier transforms. We applied this approach to detect potential compromising electromagnetic emanations radiated by modern keyboard. Since keyboards are often used to transmit confidential data such as passwords, these emanations could remotely reveal sensitive information such as keystrokes. Thanks to this method, we detected four different kinds of compromising electromagnetic emanations generated by wired and wireless keyboards. These emissions lead to a full or a partial recovery of the keystrokes. We implemented these side-channel attacks and our best practical attack fully recovered 95% of the keystrokes of a PS/2 keyboard at a distance up to 20 meters, even through walls.
000171931 700__ $$0243336$$g114328$$aVuagnoux, Martin
000171931 700__ $$aPasini, Sylvain$$g150581$$0240945
000171931 7112_ $$dJul 25-30, 2010$$cFt Lauderdale, FL$$aIEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
000171931 773__ $$t2010 Ieee International Symposium On Electromagnetic Compatibility (Emc 2010)$$q121-126
000171931 8564_ $$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/171931/files/texfile.pdf$$zn/a$$s432328$$yn/a
000171931 909C0 $$xU10433$$0252183$$pLASEC
000171931 909CO $$qGLOBAL_SET$$pconf$$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:171931$$pIC
000171931 917Z8 $$x186617
000171931 937__ $$aEPFL-CONF-171931
000171931 973__ $$rNON-REVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED$$aEPFL
000171931 980__ $$aCONF