000166079 001__ 166079
000166079 005__ 20190812205524.0
000166079 037__ $$aCONF
000166079 245__ $$aAutomated Vulnerability Discovery in Distributed Systems
000166079 269__ $$a2011
000166079 260__ $$c2011
000166079 336__ $$aConference Papers
000166079 520__ $$aIn this paper we present a technique for automatically assessing the amount of damage a small number of participant nodes can inflict on the overall performance of a large distributed system. We propose a feedback-driven tool that synthesizes malicious nodes in distributed systems, aiming to maximize the performance impact on the overall behavior of the distributed system. Our approach focuses on the interface of interaction between correct and faulty nodes, clearly differentiating the two categories. We build and evaluate a prototype of our approach and show that it is able to discover vulnerabilities in real systems, such as PBFT, a Byzantine Fault Tolerant system. We describe a scenario generated by our tool, where even a single malicious client can bring a BFT system of over 250 nodes down to zero throughput.
000166079 700__ $$0244104$$g188204$$aBanabic, Radu
000166079 700__ $$0241982$$g172241$$aCandea, George
000166079 700__ $$0240335$$g105326$$aGuerraoui, Rachid
000166079 7112_ $$d2011$$cHong Kong, China$$a7th Workshop on Hot Topics in System Dependability (HotDep)
000166079 8564_ $$zn/a$$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/166079/files/AVD.pdf$$s319049
000166079 909C0 $$xU11275$$pDSLAB$$0252225
000166079 909C0 $$0252114$$xU10407$$pDCL
000166079 909CO $$qGLOBAL_SET$$pconf$$pIC$$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:166079
000166079 917Z8 $$x184038
000166079 917Z8 $$x188204
000166079 937__ $$aEPFL-CONF-166079
000166079 973__ $$rREVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED$$aEPFL
000166079 980__ $$aCONF