The Improbable Differential Attack: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round CLEFIA

In this paper we present a new statistical cryptanalytic technique that we call improbable differential cryptanalysis which uses a differential that is less probable when the correct key is used. We provide data complexity estimates for this kind of attacks and we also show a method to expand impossible differentials to improbable differentials. By using this expansion method, we cryptanalyze 13, 14, and 15-round CLEFIA for the key sizes of length 128, 192, and 256 bits, respectively. These are the best cryptanalytic results on CLEFIA up to this date.


Published in:
Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2010, 6498, 197-209
Presented at:
11th International Conference on Cryptology in India, Hyderabad, India, December 12-15, 2010
Year:
2010
Publisher:
Berlin Heidelberg, Springer
ISBN:
978-3-642-17400-1
Keywords:
Laboratories:




 Record created 2010-12-18, last modified 2018-03-17

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