Some remarks on Lucas-Based cryptosystems

We review the well-known relation between Lucas sequences and exponentiation. This leads to the observation that certain public-key cryptosystems that are based on the use of Lucas sequences have some elementary properties their re-inventors were apparently not aware of. In particular, we present a chosen-message forgery for `LUC' [Smith, 1993] and [Smith and Lennon, 1993], and we show that `LUCELG' and `LUCDIF' [Smith, 1994] and [Smith and Skinner, 1994] are vulnerable to subexponential time attacks. This proves that various claims that were made about Lucas-based cryptosystems are incorrect


Published in:
Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '95. 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference. Proceedings, 386 - 96
Presented at:
Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '95. 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference. Proceedings, Berlin, Germany
Year:
1995
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 Record created 2010-06-24, last modified 2018-03-17

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