Hill-Climbing Attack to an Eigenface-Based Face Verification System

We use a general hill-climbing attack algorithm based on Bayesian adaption to test the vulnerability of an Eigenface-based approach for face recognition against indirect attacks. The attacking technique uses the scores provided by the matcher to adapt a global distribution, computed from a development set of users, to the local specificities of the client being attacked. The proposed attack is evaluated on an Eigenfacebased verification system using the XM2VTS database. The results show a very high efficiency of the hill-climbing algorithm, which successfully bypassed the system for over 85% of the attacked accounts.

Presented at:
Proceedings of the First IEEE International Conference on Biometrics, Identity and Security (BIdS)

 Record created 2010-02-11, last modified 2018-01-28

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