DÃ¼tting, Paul
Henzinger, Monika R.
Weber, Ingmar
Leonardi, Stefano
Bidder Optimal Assignments for General Utilities
Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Network & Internet Economics
Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Network & Internet Economics
Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Network & Internet Economics
Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Network & Internet Economics
bidder optimality
general utilities
stable matching
truthful mechanism
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2009
2009
We study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has a general, strictly monotonic utility functions u_{i,j}(p_j) expressing her utility of being matched to item j at price p_j . For this setting we prove that a bidder optimal outcome always exists, even when the utility functions are non-linear and non-continuous. Furthermore, we give an algorithm to find such a solution. Although the running time of this algorithm is exponential in the number of items, it is polynomial in the number of bidders.
Springer
Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Network & Internet Economics
Conference Papers
000278097500058