000141840 001__ 141840
000141840 005__ 20180317094354.0
000141840 02470 $$2ISI$$a000278097500058
000141840 037__ $$aCONF
000141840 245__ $$aBidder Optimal Assignments for General Utilities
000141840 260__ $$aBerlin$$bSpringer$$c2009
000141840 269__ $$a2009
000141840 336__ $$aConference Papers
000141840 490__ $$aLecture Notes in Computer Science$$v5929-0575
000141840 520__ $$aWe study the problem of matching bidders to items where each bidder i has a  general, strictly monotonic utility functions u_{i,j}(p_j) expressing her utility of  being matched to item j at price p_j . For this setting we prove that a bidder  optimal outcome always exists, even when the utility functions are non-linear  and non-continuous. Furthermore, we give an algorithm to  find such a solution.  Although the running time of this algorithm is exponential in the number of  items, it is polynomial in the number of bidders.
000141840 6531_ $$abidder optimality
000141840 6531_ $$ageneral utilities
000141840 6531_ $$astable matching
000141840 6531_ $$atruthful mechanism
000141840 6531_ $$asponsored search
000141840 700__ $$0243546$$aDütting, Paul$$g170317
000141840 700__ $$0243545$$aHenzinger, Monika R.$$g165464
000141840 700__ $$aWeber, Ingmar
000141840 7112_ $$a5th Workshop on Network & Internet Economics (WINE)$$cRome$$dDecember 14-18, 2009
000141840 720_1 $$aLeonardi, Stefano$$eed.
000141840 773__ $$q575-582$$tProceedings of the 5th Workshop on Network & Internet Economics
000141840 8564_ $$uhttp://www.dis.uniroma1.it/~wine09/$$zURL
000141840 8564_ $$s136019$$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/141840/files/wine09proceedings.pdf$$zn/a
000141840 909CO $$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:141840$$pconf
000141840 909C0 $$0252227$$pLTAA$$xU11062
000141840 937__ $$aLTAA-CONF-2009-004
000141840 973__ $$aEPFL$$rREVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED
000141840 980__ $$aCONF