000140362 001__ 140362
000140362 005__ 20190117210855.0
000140362 037__ $$aREP_WORK
000140362 245__ $$aMore on Castor: the Scalable Secure Routing for Ad-hoc Networks
000140362 269__ $$a2009
000140362 260__ $$c2009
000140362 336__ $$aReports
000140362 520__ $$aWireless ad hoc networks are inherently vulnerable, as any node can disrupt the communication of potentially any other node in the network. Many solutions to this problem have been proposed. In this paper, we take a fresh and comprehensive approach, simultaneously addressing three aspects: security, scalability and adaptability to changing network conditions. Our communication protocol, Castor, occupies a unique point in the design space: it does not use any control messages except simple packet acknowledgments, and each node makes routing decisions locally and independently of other nodes without exchanging routing state with them. This novel design makes Castor resilient to a wide range of attacks and allows it to scale to large network sizes and to remain efficient under high mobility. We compare Castor against four representative protocols from the literature. Our protocol achieves up to two times higher packet delivery rates, particularly in large and highly volatile networks, incurs no or only limited additional overhead and it is able to survive more severe attacks and recovers from them faster.
000140362 700__ $$0242023$$aGaluba, Wojciech$$g168204
000140362 700__ $$0242753$$aPapadimitratos, Panos$$g171990
000140362 700__ $$0242756$$aPoturalski, Marcin$$g171468
000140362 700__ $$0240941$$aAberer, Karl$$g134136
000140362 700__ $$0241115$$aDespotovic, Zoran$$g131924
000140362 700__ $$aKellerer, Wolfgang
000140362 8564_ $$zURL
000140362 8564_ $$s367927$$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/140362/files/tech_report_upload.pdf$$yn/a$$zn/a
000140362 909C0 $$0252004$$pLSIR$$xU10405
000140362 909C0 $$0252614$$pLCA$$xUS00024
000140362 909C0 $$0252452$$pLCA1$$xU10426
000140362 909CO $$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:140362$$pIC$$preport
000140362 937__ $$aLSIR-REPORT-2009-002
000140362 973__ $$aEPFL$$sPUBLISHED
000140362 980__ $$aREPORT