000140268 001__ 140268
000140268 005__ 20190316234607.0
000140268 02470 $$2ISI$$a000274558900068
000140268 037__ $$aCONF
000140268 245__ $$aCooperation in Underwater Sensor Networks
000140268 269__ $$a2009
000140268 260__ $$bIEEE$$c2009
000140268 336__ $$aConference Papers
000140268 520__ $$aIn underwater sensor networks (UWSNs), one of the main concerns is to reduce the energy consumption in order to maximize the lifetime. This work focuses on multiple sensor networks governed by different authorities. If the authorities are willing to cooperate by forwarding each others' packets, the global lifetime could be increased. However, a selfish authority could exploit the others' collaborative behaviors. To investigate this cooperation, we apply concepts such as evolutionary game theory. A first analysis of a simple model determines that cooperation underwater can emerge without incentives. Then, we explore with an extended model what influences cooperation and in which way. Finally, we demonstrate how a new authority can fine tune its strategy when deploying its UWSN.
000140268 6531_ $$agame theory
000140268 6531_ $$aunderwater sensor networks
000140268 6531_ $$aevolutionary game theory
000140268 6531_ $$acooperation
000140268 700__ $$0241989$$aGarcin, Florent$$g154647
000140268 700__ $$aManshaei, Mohammad Hossein
000140268 700__ $$aHubaux, Jean-Pierre
000140268 7112_ $$aInternational Conference on Game Theory for Networks$$cIstanbul, TURKEY$$dMay 13-15, 2009
000140268 773__ $$q540-548$$tProceedings of the International Conference On Game Theory For Networks (Gamenets 2009)
000140268 8564_ $$s196742$$uhttps://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/140268/files/GameNets-Garcin.pdf$$yn/a$$zn/a
000140268 909C0 $$0252184$$pLIA$$xU10406
000140268 909CO $$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:140268$$pconf$$pIC$$qGLOBAL_SET
000140268 917Z8 $$x154647
000140268 917Z8 $$x154647
000140268 937__ $$aEPFL-CONF-140268
000140268 973__ $$aEPFL$$rREVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED
000140268 980__ $$aCONF