



Efficient Protocols for Set Membership and Range Proofs

Jan Camenisch¹

Rafik Chaabouni^{1,2}

abhi shelat³

¹IBM ZRL

²EPFL LASEC

³U. of Virginia

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New Efficient Protocols for Set Membership and Range Proofs

● Set Membership

Public parameters: set Φ of integer elements, $C = Com(m)$

Prover

$m \in \Phi$

Verifier

$PK\{m : C=Com(m) \wedge m \in \Phi\}$



- Range (Interval) Proof: $\Phi = [a, b)$
- m must not be revealed (zero-knowledge)
- Honest Verifier Model (Malicious Verifier possible)
- Asymptotically Better Efficiency

Practically Competitive

Usefulness?

- Cryptography Primitives
- Revocation Credentials (Freshness of a Token)
- Anonymous Credentials (Identity and Authentication Proofs)

Example: Use of Range Proof

- Offer from IACR to travel to Melbourne, Australia for the Asiacrypt 2008 conference.
- Restriction for young PhD candidates: under 26, but older than 18.
- Strict age anonymity for the airplane company.
- Bob wants to go (he has a paper accepted).

- 1 Introduction
 - Our Focus Interest
 - Community Interest
- 2 **Prior State of the Art**
 - **Common Range Proofs**
 - **Berry Schoenmakers' Scheme**
- 3 Our New Solutions
 - Better Solutions?
 - Breeding Ground
 - New Set Membership
 - Application to Range Proof
- 4 Conclusion

Boudot's range proof with RSA assumption

- Positivity proofs: $x \in (a, b) \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} 0 < x - a; \\ 0 < b - x. \end{cases}$
- In presentation: Sum of four square.
- Lagrange Theorem ~1770: Any positive number can be represented as the sum of four square

Sum of square method

- Rabin and Shallit 1986: probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm (4 square method)
 - Some numbers can be represented as the sum of three square (Numbers that cannot be the sum of 3 squares: $4^n(8x + 7)$)
- Application to positivity proofs by Lipmaa in 2001 for the 4 square method
- Application to positivity proofs by Groth in 2005 for the 3 square method

Disadvantages

- RSA Assumption
- Large Complexity: $O(k^4)$

Folklore Bit Commitment

Public parameters: $\Phi = [0, 2^k)$, C and C_i

Prover

$$m \in \Phi, m = \prod_{i=0}^{k-1} m_i 2^i$$

$$C = \text{Com}(m), C_i = \text{Com}(m_i)$$

Verifier

$$\frac{\text{PK}\{(m_i, \forall i) : C_i = \text{Com}(m_i) \wedge m_i \in \{0,1\}\}}{\text{OR-Proof} \sim 2 \text{ Schnorr proofs}}$$

Schnorr proof

Prover

$$x = \log_g h$$

$$d = g^u, u \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p \longrightarrow d$$

$$\longleftarrow c$$

$$r = u + cx \longrightarrow r$$

Verifier

h

$$c \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$$

$$g^r \stackrel{?}{=} dh^c$$

Folklore Bit Commitment

Public parameters: $\Phi = [0, 2^k)$, $C = \text{Com}(m)$ and $C_i = \text{Com}(m_i)$

Prover

$$m \in \Phi, m = \prod_{i=0}^{k-1} m_i 2^i$$

Verifier

$$\frac{PK\{(m_i, \forall i) : C_i = \text{Com}(m_i) \wedge m_i \in \{0,1\}\}}{\text{OR-Proof} \sim 2 \text{ Schnorr proofs}}$$

Properties

- No RSA Assumption
- Still Large Complexity: $O(k)$

Building Blocks

- Improvements of folklore bit decomposition
- Exact proofs for small intervals
- Reduction of arbitrary ranges $[0, b)$ into 2 bit decompositions
 - AND-composition: $[0, b) = [0, 2^k) \cap [b - 2^k, b)$
 - OR-composition: $[0, b) = [0, 2^{k-1}) \cup [b - 2^{k-1}, b)$

Earlier Work

- [LAN02]

Decomposition of Upper Bound

- Product case $b = de$
- Sum case $b = d + e$
- Recursion down to Schnorr proofs
- Complexity of number b : minimal number of element 1 in order to write b with products and sums of element 1, including parentheses $7 = (1 + 1) * (1 + 1 + 1) + 1$.

Complexity?

- Asymptotic Complexity Still: $O(\log b) \sim O(k)$

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Our Solution

- $Com(u, \ell) = O\left(\frac{k}{\log k - \log \log k}\right)$
- No RSA Assumptions
- Very competitive solution.

Shaking the Tree of Knowledge

- Why bit decomposition? What about base 3?
 - Generalization to base u ...

Base u Commitment

Public parameters: $\Phi = [0, u^\ell)$, $C = \text{Com}(m)$ and $C_i = \text{Com}(m_i)$

Prover

$$m \in \Phi, m = \prod_{i=0}^{\ell-1} m_i u^i$$

Verifier

$$\text{PK}\{(m_i, \forall i) : C_i = \text{Com}(m_i) \wedge m_i \in \{0, \dots, u-1\}\}$$

$\xrightarrow{\ell \text{ OR-Proofs} \sim O(u) \text{ Schnorr proofs}}$

Not Enough...

- Asymptotic Complexity: $O(u \cdot \ell)$

Shaking the Tree of Knowledge

- Why Schnorr proofs for basic set membership?
 - Signature based solution (Boneh-Boyen signatures in the Adaptive Oblivious Transfer of Jan Camenisch, Gregory Neven, and abhi shelat)
 - Cryptographic accumulators based solution (elements compression into a single accumulator with a witness on the accumulator membership for each element)

Set Membership Protocol

- Reduction of Set Membership to proving knowledge of signed messages without revealing them

Prover

$m \in \Phi, C = Com(m)$

(e.g. Pedersen)

Verifier

C

$\xleftarrow[\text{(e.g. Boneh-Boyen Sign.)}]{\{A_i\}} A_i = Sign(i), \forall i \in \Phi$

$V = Blind(A_m) \xrightarrow{V}$

$\xleftarrow{PK\{(m,r,z): C=g^m h^r \wedge e(V,y)=e(V,g)^{-m}e(g,g)^z\}}$

Insight

- u -ary decomposition $[0, u^\ell)$
e.g. for $u = 5 \Rightarrow 334 = 2 \cdot 5^3 + 3 \cdot 5^2 + 1 \cdot 5^1 + 4 \cdot 5^0$
- Signature based Set Membership for set $\mathbb{Z}_u = \{0, 1, \dots, u-1\}$

Range Proof Protocol

Public parameters: $\Phi = [0, u^\ell)$, $C = Com(m)$ and $C_j = Com(m_j)$

Prover

Verifier

$$m \in \Phi, m = \prod_{j=0}^{\ell-1} m_j u^j$$

$$\leftarrow \{A_i\} \quad A_i = \text{Sign}(i), \forall i \in \mathbb{Z}_u$$

$$V_j = \text{Blind}(A_{m_j}), \forall j \quad \{V_j\} \rightarrow$$

$$\leftarrow PK\{(m_j, r_j, z_j) : C_j = g^{m_j} h^{r_j} \wedge e(V_j, y) = e(V_j, g)^{-m_j} e(g, g)^{z_j}\} \rightarrow$$

Communication Complexity

$$O(u) + O(\ell) + O(\ell) \cdot O(1) = O(u + \ell) \text{ v.s. } O(u \cdot \ell)$$

Asymptotic Communication Complexity

- Relation to security parameter: $u^\ell \geq 2^{k-1}$
- Possible optimal choice for u could be $u = \frac{k}{\log k}$
- $Com(u, \ell) = O\left(\frac{k}{\log k - \log \log k}\right)$

Practical Communication Complexity

- Concrete optimization possible in the choice of u
- Minimize $Com(u, \ell)$ under constraint $u \log^2 u = \frac{c_2 \log b}{c_1} = B$
- Vaudenay's hint: $u = \frac{B}{\log^2 u} = \frac{B}{(\log B - 2 \log \log u)^2}$

Handling arbitrary ranges $[a, b)$

- General case (AND-composition): $u^{\ell-1} < b < u^\ell$
- $m \in [a, b) \Leftrightarrow m \in [a, a + u^\ell) \cap m \in [b - u^\ell, b)$
- 2 other potential optimizations
- If $b - a = u^\ell$, $m \in [a, b) \Leftrightarrow m - a \in [0, u^\ell)$
- If $a + u^{\ell-1} < b$ OR-composition:
 $[a, b) = [b - u^{\ell-1}, b) \cup [a, a + u^{\ell-1})$

Recall Bob's Example

- Bob wants to apply for IACR offer (free trip to Asiacrypt 08 for PhD candidates with $18 \leq \text{age} < 26$).
- Using the Unix Epoch system to encode the birth date, we obtain the following allowed range: [347184000, 599644800)

Potential Example

- Communication load comparison for range proof [347184000, 599644800):
- For very large ranges, Boudot's method wins with the strong RSA assumption
- If no RSA assumption made, our scheme performs better.
- Complexity varies with range and setup assumptions.

<i>Scheme</i>	<i>Communication Complexity</i>
Our new range proof	45824 bits
Boudot's method	48946 bits
Standard bit-by-bit method	96768 bits
Schoenmakers' method	50176 bits

- Further work in progress by Helger Lipmaa for general case of arbitrary ranges.
- Bob can travel safely without being bothered with age anonymity
- Questions?

\end{session}