000118378 001__ 118378
000118378 005__ 20180317093811.0
000118378 02470 $$2Scopus$$a2-s2.0-0036183625
000118378 037__ $$aARTICLE
000118378 245__ $$aAn optimal IPO mechanism
000118378 269__ $$a2002
000118378 260__ $$c2002
000118378 336__ $$aJournal Articles
000118378 500__ $$aUniversity of Toulouse, France
000118378 500__ $$aTY  - JOUR
000118378 500__ $$aCited By (since 1996): 15
000118378 500__ $$aExport Date: 10 March 2008
000118378 500__ $$aSource: Scopus
000118378 520__ $$aWe analyse the optimal Initial Public Offering (IPO) mechanism in a multidimensional adverse selection setting where institutional investors have private information about the market valuation of the shares, the intermediary has private information about the demand, and the institutional investors and intermediary collude. Theorem 1 states that uniform pricing is optimal (all agents pay the same price) and characterizes the IPO price in terms of conditional expectations. Theorem 2 states that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a non-linear price schedule decreasing in the quantity allocated to retail investors. This is similar to IPO procedures used in the U.K. and France. Relying on French IPO data we perform a GMM structural estimation and test of the model. The price schedule is estimated and the conditions characterizing the optimal mechanism are not rejected.
000118378 700__ $$aBiais, B.
000118378 700__ $$0241931$$aBossaerts, P.$$g181386
000118378 700__ $$aRochet, J.-C.
000118378 773__ $$j69$$k1$$q117-146$$tReview of Economic Studies
000118378 909CO $$ooai:infoscience.tind.io:118378$$particle$$pCDM
000118378 909C0 $$0252272$$pSFI-PB$$xU11813
000118378 937__ $$aSFI-PB-ARTICLE-2002-003
000118378 970__ $$a13/LDMU
000118378 973__ $$aEPFL$$rREVIEWED$$sPUBLISHED
000118378 980__ $$aARTICLE