Security of a Leakage-Resilient Protocol for Key Establishment and Mutual Authentication

We revisit Shin et al.’s leakage-resilient password-based authenticated key establishment protocol (LR-AKEP) and the security model used to prove the security of LR-AKEP. By refining the Leak oracle in the security model, we show that LR-AKE (1) can, in fact, achieve a stronger notion of leakage-resilience than initially claimed and (2) also achieve an additional feature of traceability, not previously mentioned.


Published in:
ProvSec '07: the 1st International Conference on Provable Security, 169-177
Presented at:
ProvSec '07: the 1st International Conference on Provable Security, Wollongong, Australia
Year:
2007
Publisher:
Springer
Laboratories:




 Record created 2007-12-17, last modified 2018-03-17

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