In this dissertation, I develop theory and evidence to argue that new technologies are central to how firms organize to create and capture value. I use computational methods such as reinforcement learning and probabilistic topic modeling to investigate three topics: the automation of routines, the organization of artificial intelligence (AI), and the evaluation of technology risk. Overall, I argue that new technologies are not a panacea for the firm but require deliberate strategic planning to manage the potential downsides of myopic automation, AI interdependencies, and the disclosure of technology risks. In the first essay, I argue that while automation can increase productivity by reducing the costs of coordinating individuals, the automation of routines can also incur an indirect opportunity cost due to slow adaptation to environmental change. I develop a reinforcement learning simulation to model the impact of automation on the returns from the division of labor in dynamic environments and to show how automation incurs opportunity costs through lost learning and slow adaptation. Moreover, automation can be suboptimal when it brings about myopic behavior, i.e. high returns from the division of labor in the short term, but negative returns in the long term. Given the simulation results, I argue that firms need dynamic routines to simultaneously balance learning and automation. I open-source the simulation platform as OrgSim-RL on GitHub. In the second essay, I argue that a data-driven culture - what I define as a Data Clan - can help to coordinate complex interdependencies between AI components within a firm. I analyze in-depth semi-structured interview data with a hierarchical stochastic block model (hSBM) and hand-coding to find that managers focus primarily on building a strong culture and establishing high-quality data assets when allocating resources to AI initiatives. Given the results, I inductively develop implications for theory and argue that the emergence of a Data Clan can be a governance mechanism to reduce coordination frictions and build a competitive advantage in the age of AI. In the third essay, I argue that investors require a higher initial return to take on more technology risk disclosure during an IPO. I quantify the magnitude of disclosed risk and the risk disclosure topics based on a latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) topic model of IPO prospectus text and find a return-for-risk association between text-based technology risk disclosure and underpricing. The study also finds evidence that owning granted patents is associated with a lower return-for-risk association, suggesting that intellectual property allows the disclosure of risk without losing the competitive advantage. I open-source the code for quantifying risk disclosure as RiskyData-LDA on GitHub. In summary, this dissertation develops theory and finds evidence across three essays to argue that leveraging new technologies requires deliberate strategic planning to manage potential downsides of new technologies, such as the opportunity costs of automation, coordination costs, and costs associated with raising capital. The results suggest three mitigating solutions: dynamic routines to balance learning and automation, a Data Clan to improve coordination, and disclosure through patents to reduce underpricing.