Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption Resistance to Side-Channel Attacks
This work performs a side-channel analysis on the Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption cipher Elisabeth-b4. In particular, a Correlation Power Analysis allows to recover the 2048-bit key with 35,000 traces. Mounting template attacks or using Machine Learning decreases this number to 1,000. We then implement 2-share masking and shuffling, which completely eliminates the leakage measure – a Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) – and mitigates the Correlation Power Analysis and template attacks. Using a Divide and Conquer Deep Learning approach, we manage to bypass them but the number of required traces increases to 250,000.
2-s2.0-105021007535
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
Nagra
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
2026
978-3-032-01405-4
Lecture Notes in Computer Science; 15952
1611-3349
0302-9743
235
260
REVIEWED
EPFL
| Event name | Event acronym | Event place | Event date |
CASCADE 2025 | Saint-Etienne, France | 2025-04-02 - 2025-04-04 | |