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research article

Linking Online Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption and Blockwise Attack Models

Endignoux, Guillaume
•
Vizár, Damian  
2017
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology

Real-world applications of authenticated encryption often require the encryption to be computable online, e.g. to compute the ith block of ciphertext after having processed the first i blocks of plaintext. A significant line of research was dedicated to identifying security notions for online authenticated encryption schemes, that capture various security goals related to real-life scenarios. Fouque, Joux, Martinet and Valette proposed definitions of privacy and integrity against adversaries that can query their oracles in a blockwise-adaptive manner, to model memory-constrained applications. A decade later, Fleischmann, Forler and Lucks proposed the notion of online nonce misuse-resistant authenticated encryption (OAE) to capture the security of online authenticated encryption under nonce-reuse. In this work we investigate the relation between these notions. We first recast the blockwise notions of Fouque et al. to make them compatible with online authenticated encryption schemes that support headers. We then show that OAE and the conjunction of the blockwise notions are “almost” equivalent. We identify the missing property on the side of blockwise notions, and formalize it under the name PR-TAG. With PR-TAG being just an auxiliary definition, the equivalence we finally show suggests that OAE and the blockwise model for online authenticated encryption capture essentially the same notion of security.

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Type
research article
DOI
10.13154/tosc.v2016.i2.125-144
Author(s)
Endignoux, Guillaume
•
Vizár, Damian  
Date Issued

2017

Published in
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
Volume

2016

Issue

2

Start page

125

End page

144

Subjects

Symmetric-key Cryptography

•

Authenticated Encryption

•

Online Encryption

•

Security Notions

Peer reviewed

REVIEWED

Written at

EPFL

EPFL units
LASEC  
Available on Infoscience
September 28, 2017
Use this identifier to reference this record
https://infoscience.epfl.ch/handle/20.500.14299/140879
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