Optimal regulation of oligopolistic markets with discrete choice models of demand
This project is inspired by the ongoing research project titled 'New generation of demand-supply interaction models', funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. In particular, the project aims at studying models to find optimal policies to regulate markets characterized by oligopolistic competition and in which consumers make a discrete choice among a finite set of alternatives. In this framework, consumers are modelled as utility maximizers, according to random utility theory. Suppliers are modelled as profit maximizers, according to the traditional microeconomic treatment. Market competition is modelled as a non-cooperative game, for which an epsilon-equilibrium solution is sought. Finally, the regulator can affect the behavior of all other agents, for instance by giving subsidies or imposing taxes. In transport markets, these interventions might target specific alternatives, to reduce externalities such as congestion or emissions, or specific segments of the population, to achieve social welfare objectives. The objective of the project is to analyze, implement and evaluate algorithms to solve realistic applications of this problem, with particular focus on the transportation sector.
2020